Philosophical Psychology

Riana Betzler

Empathy: epistemic problems and cultural-historical perspectives of a cross-disciplinary concept

Clear definitions of alienation and solidarity are needed as a step toward an explicit theory of social integration. The idea of alienation has played a key role in the development of sociology, but it's meaning has never been clear. Both theories and empirical studies confound relational–dispositional, cognitive–emotional and/or interpersonal–societal components. This essay proposes definitions that follow from the work of Erving Goffman and others. Goffman's idea of “co-presence” implies a model of solidarity as mutual awareness to the point of merging consciousness. It appears that this concept of solidarity could be the main component of shared context, consensus, genuine love and social facts. Two empirical approaches are described, one with moment by moment analysis of dialogue, the other using sample surveys. With the use of mathematical notation, the survey method might be used to analyze social facts. The model could also form the basis for an explicit and testable theory of social integration.

Thomas J. Scheff

A Concept of Social Integration

Abstract The purpose of this paper is to reflect on the origins of social understanding. Drawing upon philosophical writings, I highlight those features of affectively patterned interpersonal relations that are especially important for a very young child's growing awareness and knowledge of itself and other people as people with their own minds. If we were without our biologically based capacities for co‐ordinated emotional relatedness with others, we should lack something essential for acquiring the concept of ‘persons’ who have subjective experiences and psychological attitudes towards the world. I illustrate some implications of this thesis by reviewing the phenomena of early childhood autism.

R. Peter Hobson

The emotional origins of social understanding

The concept of volition has a long history in Western thought, but is looked upon unfavorably in contemporary philosophy and psychology. This paper proposes and elaborates a unifying conception of volition, which views volition as a mediating executive mental process that bridges the gaps between an agent's deliberation, decision and voluntary bodily action. Then the paper critically examines three major skeptical arguments against volition: volition is a mystery, volition is an illusion, and volition is a fundamentally flawed conception that leads to infinite regress. It is shown that all these charges are untenable and the arguments are far from decisive to dismiss the concept of volition. In addition, it is suggested that a naturalistic approach, which takes philosophical inquiry as continuous with the scientific study of volition, is a promising way to demystify volition.

Jing Zhu

Understanding volition

ABSTRACT This paper introduces the notion of a “psychologically rich life”: a life characterized by complexity, in which people experience a variety of interesting things, and feel and appreciate a variety of deep emotions via firsthand experiences or vicarious experiences. A psychologically rich life can be contrasted with a boring and monotonous life, in which one feels a singular emotion or feels that their lives are defined by routines that just aren’t that interesting. Our discussion considers how it is that the psychologically rich life compares to other leading theories of the good life discussed within both philosophy and psychology, and it argues that a psychologically rich life ought to be recognized as a distinct and compelling form of the good life.

Lorraine L. Besser

Shigehiro Oishi

The psychologically rich life

ABSTRACT There has been a resurgence of interest lately within the philosophy of mind and action in the category of mental action. Against this background, the present paper aims to question the very possibility, or at least the theoretical significance, of teasing apart mental and bodily acts. After raising some doubts over the viability of various possible ways of drawing the mental-act–bodily-act distinction, the paper draws some lessons from debates over embodied cognition which, arguably, further undermine the credibility of the distinction. The insignificance of the distinction is demonstrated in part by showing how the focus on “inner” acts hampers fruitful discussion of Galen Strawson’s skepticism of mental agency. Finally, the possibility is discussed that a distinction between covert and overt action should supplant the one between mental and bodily action.

Yair Levy

What is ‘mental action’?

Tobias Starzak

Tobias Schlicht

Can affordances be reasons?

Four studies measured or manipulated beliefs in free will to illuminate how such beliefs are linked to other aspects of personality. Study 1 showed that stronger belief in free will was correlated with more gratitude, greater life satisfaction, lower levels of perceived life stress, a greater sense of self-efficacy, greater perceived meaning in life, higher commitment in relationships, and more willingness to forgive relationship partners. Study 2 showed that the belief in free will was a stronger predictor of life satisfaction, meaning in life, gratitude, and self-efficacy than either locus of control or implicit person theory. Study 3 showed that experimentally manipulating disbelief in free will caused a reduction in the perceived meaningfulness of life. Study 4 found that inducing a stronger belief in free will caused people to set more meaningful goals for themselves. The possible concern that believers in free will simply claim all manner of positive traits was contradicted by predicted null findings with regard to sense of humor, empathy, and self-rated attractiveness. Taken together, the present studies show that the belief in free will is a strong predictor of several positive traits and outcomes.

A. Will Crescioni

Roy F. Baumeister

Sarah E. Ainsworth

Michael Ent

Nathaniel M. Lambert

Subjective correlates and consequences of belief in free will

Abstract In information theory there is a fundamental principle, usually referred to as the informational “uncertainty principle”, which expresses a limitation of any information processing system (or agent) in terms of a relation between the system's response property and its inherent processing capacity. From this principle, it can be argued that a salutary strategy for dealing with conflicting information processing requirements is to adopt various complementary processes (or channels). Donald M. MacKay had attempted to relate the informational uncertainty principle to spatial and temporal response properties of neurons in the mammalian visual cortex, and suggested that the spatial and the temporal aspects of such neurons are complementary. I attempt to extend his efforts and to show that the informational uncertainty principle may indeed underlie many complementary relations exhibited in human perception and cognition, such as the relation between the two principal processing streams in vision and the...

Charles Q. Wu

Complementarity in vision and cognition

ABSTRACT In our daily lives, we need to predict and understand others’ behavior in order to navigate through our social environment. Predictions concerning other humans’ behavior usually refer to their mental states, such as beliefs or intentions. Such a predictive strategy is called ‘adoption of the intentional stance.’ In this paper, we review literature related to the concept of intentional stance from the perspectives of philosophy, psychology, human development, culture, and human-robot interaction. We propose that adopting the intentional stance might be a pivotal factor in facilitating social attunement with artificial agents. The paper first reviews the theoretical considerations regarding the intentional stance and examines literature related to the development of the intentional stance across life span. Subsequently, we discuss cultural norms as grounded in the intentional stance, and finally, we focus on the issue of adopting the intentional stance toward artificial agents, such as humanoid robots. At the dawn of the artificial intelligence era, the question of how – and also when – we predict and explain robots’ behavior by referring to mental states is of high interest. The paper concludes with a discussion on ethical consequences of adopting the intentional stance toward robots, and sketches future directions in research on this topic.

Jairo Perez-Osorio

Agnieszka Wykowska

Adopting the intentional stance toward natural and artificial agents

Maxwell Gatyas

Emotion sharing as empathic

ABSTRACT This essay challenges some assumptions of prevalent theories of empathy. The empathizer, according to these theories, must have an emotion or a representation that matches the recipient’s emotion or representation. I argue that these conditions fail to account for important cases, namely surrogate and out-group empathy. In the course of this argument, I isolate some conceptual difficulties in extant models of cognitive empathy. In place of the matching theories, I propose an indexical model that (1) distinguishes virtual from real self-reference and (2) replaces self–other distinctions with an epistemic condition. According to this account, empathy occurs when we index an intention to another person about whom we have the relevant knowledge or understanding.

Kevin Harrelson

Intention and empathy

ABSTRACT While over the last few decades AI research has largely focused on building tools and applications, recent technological developments have prompted a resurgence of interest in building a genuinely intelligent artificial agent – one that has a mind in the same sense that humans and animals do. In this paper, I offer a theoretical and methodological framework for this project of investigating “artificial minded intelligence” (AMI) that can help to unify existing approaches and provide new avenues for research. I first outline three desiderata that a framework for AMI research should satisfy. In Section 1, I further motivate the desiderata as well as the need for a new framework. Section 2 develops a general methodological approach, the “generative methodology,” and Section 3 develops a version of this methodology, the “Competence Framework for AI research” (CFAI).

Lisa Miracchi

A competence framework for artificial intelligence research

ABSTRACT Time-consciousness has long been a focus of research in phenomenology and phenomenological psychology. We advance and extend this tradition of research by focusing on the character of temporal experience under conditions of mania. Symptom scales and diagnostic criteria for mania are peppered with temporally inflected language: increased rate of speech, racing thoughts, flight-of-ideas, hyperactivity. But what is the underlying structure of temporal experience in manic episodes? We tackle this question using a strategically hybrid approach. We recover and reconstruct three hypotheses regarding manic temporality that were advanced and modeled by two pioneers of clinical phenomenology: Eugène Minkowski (1885–1972) and Ludwig Binswanger (1881–1966). We then test, critique, and refine these hypotheses using heterophenomenological methods in an interview-based study of persons with a history of bipolar and a current diagnosis of acute mania. Our conclusions support a central hypothesis due to Minkowski and Binswanger, namely, that disturbance in the formal structure of temporal experience is a core feature of mania. We argue that a suitably refined variant of Binswanger’s model of disturbance in manic protention helps to explain a striking pattern of impaired insight and impaired reasoning in manic episodes.

Wayne Martin

Tania Gergel

Gareth S. Owen

Manic temporality

Abstract I argue that the state of boredom (i.e., the transitory and non-pathological experience of boredom) should be understood to be a regulatory psychological state that has the capacity to promote our well-being by contributing to personal growth and to the construction (or reconstruction) of a meaningful life.

短名	Philos. Psychol.
Journal Impact	1.34
国际分区	PSYCHOLOGY, MULTIDISCIPLINARY(Q3)
期刊索引	SCI Q3中科院 3 区

ISSN	0951-5089, 1465-394X
h-index	54
国内分区	哲学(3区)哲学伦理学(4区)哲学心理学综合(4区)

涉及主题	心理学哲学认识论认知科学生物认知心理学神经科学医学计算机科学精神科政治学法学社会心理学认知数学
出版信息	出版商: Routledge，出版周期: ，期刊类型: journal，开源期刊: 非开源
基本数据	创刊年份: 1988，原创研究文献占比: 99.15%，自引率:7.10%， Gold OA占比: 28.76%

Philosophical Psychology

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Can affordances be reasons?

Emotion sharing as empathic

Intention and empathy

The psychologically rich life

Adopting the intentional stance toward natural and artificial agents

What is ‘mental action’?

A competence framework for artificial intelligence research

Empathy: epistemic problems and cultural-historical perspectives of a cross-disciplinary concept

Manic temporality

The good of boredom

Empathy: epistemic problems and cultural-historical perspectives of a cross-disciplinary concept

A Concept of Social Integration

The emotional origins of social understanding

Understanding volition

The psychologically rich life

What is ‘mental action’?

Can affordances be reasons?

Subjective correlates and consequences of belief in free will

Complementarity in vision and cognition

Adopting the intentional stance toward natural and artificial agents