Yasmin Haddad

Journal for General Philosophy of Science

Demystifying Downward Causation in Biology

揭秘生物学中的下行因果关系

Abstract According to Kant’s philosophy of geometry, Euclidean geometry is synthetic a priori . The advent of non-Euclidean geometries proved this position at least problematic, if not obsolete. However, based on Nash’s embedding theorems we show that a weaker notion of preeminence supports the view that Euclidean geometry, even though not strictly a priori , enjoys a more fundamental status than non-Euclidean geometries.

Mircea Dumitru

Liviu Ornea

On the Preeminence of Euclidean Geometry: Nash’s Embedding Theorems

论欧几里得几何的卓越性：纳什嵌入定理

Jonas Lipski

Transaction Costs Economics and Good Scientific Practice

交易成本经济学与良好的科学实践

Abstract Penrose’s conformal cyclic cosmology describes the cosmos as a collection of successive universes, the so-called aeons. The beginning and ending of our universe are directly connected to two other, anterior and posterior, universes. Penrose considers but rules out a different interpretation of conformal cyclic cosmology: that the beginning of our universe is connected to its own end in a cosmic loop. The paper argues that the view, aeon monism, should be regarded as a natural interpretation of conformal cyclic cosmology and discusses its implications for the concept of eternal return in light of the most popular metaphysics of time.

Baptiste Le Bihan

The Great Loop: From Conformal Cyclic Cosmology to Aeon Monism

大环：从共形循环宇宙学到永世一元论

Abstract Cultural evolutionary psychology (CEP) accounts for the cultural evolution of cognition. It is based on evolutionary psychology and cultural evolutionary theory and aims at a synthetic attempt which is achieved by what we want to call ‘generalization by recursion’. We argue in this paper that the evolutionary psychology program as a whole could greatly benefit from CEP’s generalization. As we will show, there is one theoretical element in particular, that CEP relevantly generalizes in contrast to its predecessors. It comes from cultural evolutionary theory and has been referred to as the ‘dual inheritance argument’. CEP’s novelty consists in showing that not only cognitive products (‘grist’) but also cognitive mechanisms (‘mills’) are subject to cultural evolution and provides lots of empirical evidence for this claim. This account is ‘recursive’, because CEP’s generalization of the dual inheritance argument theoretically employs a recursive feedback-loop between cultural learning and cultural evolution. We also argue that this account might be considered to supersede unificatory and reductionistic efforts of its competitors, because it is stronger than purely structural or analogical unification while at the same time it is not too strong in order to fall prey to implausible reductionism.

Karim Baraghith

Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla

Cultural Evolutionary Psychology as Generalization by Recursion

文化进化心理学作为递归泛化

Abstract This paper presents a reading of Bacon’s Novum Organum and the inductive method he offers therein. According to this reading, Bacon’s induction is the search for forms that are necessary and sufficient for making simple natures present. Simple natures are observable qualities. However, in the paper we argue that forms can best be understood via Bacon’s appetitive physics, according to which particles and bodies are endowed with appetites or inclinations that lead to bodily transformations. We argue that this conceptual elaboration of the notion of form changes our understanding of Bacon’s inductive method. In fact, his inductive method is a reductive program designed to find, for each observable quality (or simple nature), the transformation or combination of transformations associated with its coming to being. The paper considers the textual evidence for this reading and argues for the benefits of this reading in relation to other, traditional interpretations.

Ori Belkind

Induction and the Principles of Love in Francis Bacon’s Philosophy of Nature

弗朗西斯·培根自然哲学中的归纳法与爱的原则

Carlo Rovelli

Back to Reichenbach

回到莱欣巴赫

Yukinori Onishi

Deep Learning-Aided Research and the Aim-of-Science Controversy

深度学习辅助研究与科学目标争议

Cory Wright

James Nguyen and Roman Frigg: Scientific Representation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022, 90pp., €21.23 (Paperback), ISBN: 9781009009157

詹姆斯·阮和罗曼·弗里格：《科学表征》。剑桥：剑桥大学出版社，2022年，90页，€21.23（平装本），ISBN：9781009009157

Abstract John S. Bell introduced the notion of beable , as opposed to the standard notion of observable , in order to emphasize the need for an unambiguous formulation of quantum mechanics. In the paper I show that Bell formulated in fact two different theories of beables. The first is somehow reminiscent of the Bohr views on quantum mechanics but, at the same time, is curiously adopted by Bell as a critical tool against the Copenhagen interpretation, whereas the second, more mature formulation was among the sources of inspiration of the so-called Primitive Ontology (PO) approach to quantum mechanics, an approach inspired to scientific realism. In the first part of the paper it is argued that, contrary to the Bell wishes, the first formulation of the theory fails to be an effective recipe for addressing the ambiguity underlying the standard formulation of quantum mechanics, whereas it is only the second formulation that successfully paves the way to the PO approach. In the second part, I consider how the distinction between the two formulations of the Bell theory of beables fares vis-a-vis the complex relationship between the theory of beables and the details of the PO approach.

Federico Laudisa

The Evolution of the Bell Notion of Beable: From Bohr to Primitive Ontology

贝尔可观测量的概念演变：从玻尔到原始本体论

《一般科学哲学杂志》是一个讨论有关科学哲学的各种态度的论坛。它的主题是个别科学的哲学基础，尤其是方法论、本体论、认识论、人类学和伦理学基础。特别强调将自然科学、文化科学和技术科学都纳入哲学语境，在这种语境中，科学哲学当前问题的历史前提和条件也被纳入讨论。 JOURNAL FOR GENERAL PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 成功地试图充当一个论坛，弥合不同科学之间的鸿沟，特别是自然科学、文化科学和社会科学。其目的之一是讨论和对比个别科学的共同以及不同的具体方法论和哲学基础，同时考虑到科学哲学的所有当前相关立场。近年来，通过考虑科学的历史维度，对当前科学哲学的问题有了相当大的了解。这就是为什么未来将更加努力地整合历史和系统考虑。该杂志包含：文章讨论报告个别国家科学哲学的现状回顾科学史和科学哲学领域主要期刊的参考书目。该杂志吸引了哲学家，尤其是科学哲学家，以及自然、文化、社会和技术科学领域的学者，他们有兴趣了解其学科的哲学含义并受到其他领域的方法、领先思想、概念和理论的转移。自2015年起，JOURNAL FOR GENERAL PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE将通过EDITORIAL MANAGER系统在线接受投稿。鼓励作者在向期刊投稿时使用这种格式，以确保您的文章得到及时处理。

The Journal for General Philosophy of Science serves as a forum for discussing various perspectives on the philosophy of science. Its focus includes the philosophical foundations of individual sciences, particularly in terms of methodology, ontology, epistemology, anthropology, and ethics. The journal emphasizes the integration of natural sciences, cultural sciences, and technological sciences within a philosophical context, addressing the historical premises and conditions of current issues in the philosophy of science. It successfully acts as a bridge between different scientific disciplines, especially natural sciences, cultural sciences, and social sciences. One of its aims is to discuss and compare the commonalities and differences in the specific methodologies and philosophical foundations of individual sciences, while considering all relevant positions in the philosophy of science. In recent years, a significant understanding of current issues in the philosophy of science has emerged through the consideration of the historical dimensions of science. Therefore, there will be a greater effort in the future to integrate historical and systematic considerations. The journal includes articles discussing the current state of the philosophy of science in various countries, reviews of the history of science, and bibliographies of major journals in the field of science and philosophy. It attracts philosophers, especially those focused on the philosophy of science, as well as scholars from the fields of natural, cultural, social, and technological sciences who are interested in the philosophical implications of their disciplines and are influenced by methodologies, leading ideas, concepts, and theories from other fields. Since 2015, the Journal for General Philosophy of Science has accepted submissions online through the EDITORIAL MANAGER system. Authors are encouraged to use this format when submitting to ensure timely processing of their articles.

《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》是一个讨论科学哲学各种观点的论坛。该期刊的主题包括个别科学的哲学基础，特别是方法论、本体论、认识论、人类学和伦理学基础。期刊特别强调将自然科学、文化科学和技术科学纳入哲学的语境中，讨论科学哲学当前问题的历史前提和条件。期刊成功地充当了一个论坛，弥合不同科学之间的鸿沟，尤其是自然科学、文化科学和社会科学。其目的之一是讨论和比较个别科学的共同点和不同点，特别是在具体方法论和哲学基础方面，同时考虑到科学哲学的所有相关立场。近年来，通过考虑科学的历史维度，科学哲学的当前问题得到了更深入的理解。因此，未来将更加努力地整合历史和系统的考量。该期刊包含：讨论个别国家科学哲学现状的文章、科学史的回顾以及科学哲学领域主要期刊的参考书目。该期刊吸引了哲学家，尤其是科学哲学家，以及自然、文化、社会和技术科学领域的学者，他们对其学科的哲学含义感兴趣，并受到其他领域的方法、思想、概念和理论的影响。自2015年起，《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》通过EDITORIAL MANAGER系统在线接受投稿。鼓励作者在向期刊投稿时使用这种格式，以确保文章得到及时处理。

Journals	Journal for General Philosophy of Science
ISSN	0925-4560, 1572-8587
h-index	20
Journal Impact	1.33
Quartiles(Global)	HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE(Q2)
Quartiles(China)	哲学(2区)哲学科学史与科学哲学(3区)