Abstract Knuuttila and Morgan (2019) challenge the widespread understanding that deidealization is no more than a simple process of relaxing assumptions to build increasingly more realistic models. They submit that, in practice, processes of model deidealization are diverse and complex and thus warrant more explicit scrutiny. Drawing on a case from economics, my analysis extends their proposal by showing how narratives, as additional representational forms, can assume a crucial role in deidealizing mathematical models. I thereby propose to consider that processes of model deidealization are not necessarily exhausted by processes in which one theoretical mathematical model is replaced with another one.

Alexandra Quack

Philosophy of Science

How Narratives Can Deidealize Models

叙事如何去理想化模型

Abstract The article reevaluates the distinction between experiment and observation. It is first argued that to get clear on what role observation plays in the generation of scientific knowledge, we need to distinguish “experiential observation” as a concept closely connected to experience from “observation” in a technical sense and from “field observation” as a concept that reasonably contrasts with “experiment.” It is then argued that observation construed as field observation can enjoy systematic epistemic advantages over experiment, contrary to appearances.

Florian J. Boge

Re-Assessing the Experiment / Observation-Divide

重新评估实验与观察的区分

Holly K. Andersen

Preface

前言

Abstract The perception/action model posits distinct streams of visual processing for perception and online motor guidance. This model is apparently supported by experiments showing that visual illusions affect action tasks less than perception. In recent years, however, critics have argued against both the validity of these experiments and their support (irrespective of their validity) for the perception/action model. In this article, I reexamine this psychophysical evidence. I argue that it strongly supports the existence of distinct representations for “perception” and “action” but only moderately supports the existence of distinct systems generating those representations.

Benjamin Henke

Reexamining the Psychophysical Evidence for the Two Visual Streams

重新审视双视觉流的心理物理学证据

Brandon Boesch

Review of Ann Johnson and Johannes Lenhard’s <i>Cultures of Prediction: How Engineering and Science Evolve with Mathematical Tools</i> - Ann Johnson and Johannes Lenhard , Cultures of Prediction: How Engineering and Science Evolve with Mathematical Tools. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (2024), 274 pp. $45.00 (paperback).

Ann Johnson 和 Johannes Lenhard 的《预测文化：工程与科学如何随数学工具演进》评述 - Ann Johnson 和 Johannes Lenhard，《预测文化：工程与科学如何随数学工具演进》。剑桥，马萨诸塞州：麻省理工学院出版社（2024年），274页，45美元（平装本）。

Abstract Governments and social scientists are increasingly developing machine learning methods to automate the process of identifying terrorists in real-time and predict future attacks. However, current operationalizations of ‘terrorist’ in artificial intelligence are difficult to justify given three issues that remain neglected: insufficient construct legitimacy, insufficient criterion validity, and insufficient construct validity. I conclude that machine learning methods should be at most used for the identification of singular individuals deemed terrorists and not for identifying possible terrorists from some more general class, nor to predict terrorist attacks more broadly, given intolerably high risks that result from such approaches.

Adrian K. Yee

Construct Validity in Automated Counter-Terrorism Analysis

自动化反恐分析中的结构效度

Abstract We examine whether the ‘privileged coordinates’ of a geometric space encode its ‘amount of structure.’ In doing so, we compare this coordinate approach to comparing amounts of structure to the more familiar auto-morphism approach. We first show that on a natural understanding of the former, it faces one of the same well known problems as the latter. We then capture a precise sense in which the two approaches are closely related to one another, and we conclude by discussing whether they might still prove useful in cases of philosophical interest, despite their shortcomings.

Thomas William Barrett

JB Manchak

What Do Privileged Coordinates Tell Us About Structure?

特权坐标如何揭示结构信息？

Abstract The making of mistakes by organisms and other living systems is a theoretically and empirically unifying feature of biological investigation. Mistake theory is a rigorous and experimentally productive way of understanding this widespread phenomenon. It does, however, run up against the long-standing ‘functions’ debate in philosophy of biology. Against the objection that mistakes are just a kind of malfunction, and that without a position on functions there can be no theory of mistakes, we reply that this is to misunderstand the theory. In this paper we set out the basic concepts of mistake theory and then argue that mistakes are a distinctive phenomenon in their own right, not just a kind of malfunction.

David S. Oderberg

Jonathan Hill

Christopher Austin

Ingo Bojak

François Cinotti

Jonathan M. Gibbins

Biological Mistake Theory and the Question of Function

生物错误理论与功能问题

For computer simulation models to usefully inform climate risk management, uncertainties in model projections must be explored and characterized. Because doing so requires running the model many times over, and because computing resources are finite, uncertainty assessment is more feasible using models that demand less computer processor time. Such models are generally simpler in the sense of being more idealized, or less realistic. So modelers face a trade-off between realism and uncertainty quantification. Seeing this trade-off for the important epistemic issue that it is requires a shift in perspective from the established simplicity literature in philosophy of science.

Casey Helgeson

Vivek Srikrishnan

Klaus Keller

Nancy Tuana

Why Simpler Computer Simulation Models Can Be Epistemically Better for Informing Decisions

Abstract There has been increased attention on how scientific communities should respond to spurious dissent. One proposed method is to hide such dissent by preventing its publication. To investigate this, I computationally model the epistemic effects of hiding dissenting evidence on scientific communities. I find that it is typically epistemically harmful to hide dissent, even when there exists an agent purposefully producing biased dissent. However, hiding dissent also allows for quicker correct epistemic consensus among scientists. Quicker consensus may be important when policy decisions must be made quickly, such as during a pandemic, suggesting times when hiding dissent may be useful.

Matthew Coates

Does it Harm Science to Suppress Dissenting Evidence?

压制异议证据是否会损害科学？

自 1934 年成立以来，科学哲学及其赞助社会科学哲学协会一直致力于从科学哲学的不同角度推进研究和自由讨论。该杂志包含散文、讨论文章和书评。

Since its establishment in 1934, the journal "Philosophy of Science" and its sponsoring society for the philosophy of social science have been dedicated to advancing research and free discussion from various perspectives of the philosophy of science. The journal includes essays, discussion articles, and book reviews.

自 1934 年成立以来，《Philosophy of Science》及其赞助的社会科学哲学协会一直致力于从科学哲学的不同角度推动研究和自由讨论。该杂志包含散文、讨论文章和书评。

Journals	Philosophy of Science
ISSN	0031-8248, 1539-767X
h-index	84
Journal Impact	1.37
Quartiles(Global)	HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE(Q1)
Quartiles(China)	哲学(2区)哲学科学史与科学哲学(2区)