The first issue of what was to become the Duke Law Journal was published in March 1951 as the Duke Bar Journal. Created to provide a medium for student expression, the Duke Bar Journal consisted entirely of student-written and student-edited work until 1953, when it began publishing faculty contributions. To reflect the inclusion of faculty scholarship, the Duke Bar Journal became the Duke Law Journal in 1957. In 1969, the Journal published its inaugural Administrative Law Symposium issue, a tradition that continues today.    Volume 1 of the Duke Bar Journal spanned two issues and 259 pages. In 1959, the Journal grew to four issues and 649 pages, growing again in 1970 to six issues and 1263 pages. Today, the Duke Law Journal publishes eight issues per volume. Our staff is committed to the purpose set forth in our constitution: to publish legal writing of superior quality. We seek to publish a collection of outstanding scholarship from established legal writers, up-and-coming authors, and our own student editors.

The first issue of the Duke Law Journal was published in March 1951 under the name Duke Bar Journal. It was created to provide a platform for student expression, consisting entirely of student-written and student-edited work until 1953, when faculty contributions were included. To reflect the inclusion of faculty scholarship, the Duke Bar Journal was renamed the Duke Law Journal in 1957. In 1969, the Journal published its inaugural Administrative Law Symposium issue, a tradition that continues today. Volume 1 of the Duke Bar Journal spanned two issues and 259 pages. By 1959, the Journal had grown to four issues and 649 pages, and in 1970 it expanded again to six issues and 1263 pages. Today, the Duke Law Journal publishes eight issues per volume. Our staff is committed to the purpose set forth in our constitution: to publish legal writing of superior quality. We aim to present a collection of outstanding scholarship from established legal writers, emerging authors, and our own student editors.

《Duke Law Journal》的第一期于1951年3月出版，最初名为《Duke Bar Journal》。该期刊旨在为学生提供表达的平台，最初完全由学生撰写和编辑，直到1953年开始接受教师的投稿。为了反映教师学术贡献的纳入，《Duke Bar Journal》于1957年更名为《Duke Law Journal》。1969年，期刊首次出版行政法研讨会特刊，这一传统至今仍在延续。第一卷的《Duke Bar Journal》包含两个期刊，共259页。1959年，期刊增至四期，649页；1970年再次增长至六期，1263页。如今，《Duke Law Journal》每卷出版八期。我们的团队致力于实现宪法中设定的目标：出版高质量的法律写作。我们希望汇集来自成熟法律作家、崭露头角的作者以及我们自己的学生编辑的杰出学术作品。

Duke Law Journal

Unlike rulemaking and judicial review, administrative adjudication is governed by a norm of exceptionalism. Agencies rarely adjudicate according to the Administrative Procedure Act’s formal adjudication provisions, and the statute has little role in defining informal adjudication or specifying its minimum procedural requirements. Due process has almost nothing to say about the matter.

The result is that there are few uniform, cross-cutting procedural requirements in adjudication, and most hearings are conducted using procedures tailored for individual agencies or programs. This Article explores the benefits and costs of adjudication’s exceptionalism norm, an analysis that implicates the familiar tension between uniformity and specialization in the law. It argues that the exceptionalism norm overemphasizes specialization, at great cost.

This Article urges a new regime designed to more properly balance the values of specialization and uniformity. The proposal contemplates that as in rulemaking, the project would entail an interbranch effort to protect fundamental rights and promote institutional integrity while preserving space for needed agency discretion.

Emily S. Bremer

Reckoning with Adjudication’s Exceptionalism Norm

审慎对待司法的例外主义规范

Racially polarized voting makes minorities more vulnerable to discriminatory changes in election laws and therefore implicates nearly every voting rights doctrine. In Thornburg v. Gingles, the Supreme Court held that racially polarized voting is a necessary—but not a sufficient—condition for a vote dilution claim under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The Court, however, has recently questioned the propriety of recognizing the existence of racially polarized voting. This colorblind approach threatens not only the Gingles factors but also Section 2’s constitutionality.

The Court treats racially polarized voting as a modern phenomenon. But the relevant starting point is the 1860s, not the 1960s. Prior to the Fifteenth Amendment’s passage, Republicans received overwhelming support from newly enfranchised Black voters in the former Confederate States and expected that support to continue. The Reconstruction Framers were thus attentive to the realities of racially polarized voting and openly recognized that extending the franchise would empower Black voters to mobilize politically and protect their own interests. Racially polarized voting was a feature—not a bug—in the passage and ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment. Accordingly, this Article argues that the Court’s treatment of racially polarized voting as a constitutional taboo is historically unfounded and doctrinally incoherent.

There are significant implications for acknowledging the role of racially polarized voting during Reconstruction. This historical insight moves vote dilution claims—and their predicate finding of racially polarized voting—far closer to the heart of the Reconstruction Amendments and challenges the Court’s hostility to race-based redistricting. It is powerful evidence that Congress is well within its enforcement authority to remedy and deter dilutive measures that exploit racially polarized voting. Finally, reconstructing racially polarized voting helps reorient voting rights doctrine toward a Fifteenth Amendment framework.

Travis Crum

Reconstructing Racially Polarized Voting

重建种族极化投票

The interest of a person in a driver’s license is “substantial,” and the suspension of a license by the State can result in “inconvenience and economic hardship suffered,” as the U.S. Supreme Court has observed, including because a license may “essential in the pursuit of a livelihood.” However, forty-four U.S. states currently require indefinite suspension of driver’s licenses for non-driving-related reasons, such as failure to appear in court or pay fines for traffic infractions. There are no systematic, peer-reviewed analyses of individual-level and county-level data regarding such suspensions. This study describes the North Carolina population of suspended drivers and assesses how driver’s license suspension statutes operate relative to geography, race, and poverty. We analyze four decades of active suspension data in North Carolina, and find over 1,225,000 active suspensions for failures to appear for or pay traffic fines (amounting to one in seven adult drivers in the state). Second, we compare these data to: county population data; county-level police traffic stop data, collected as required by statute in North Carolina; and county-level data on volume and composition of traffic court dockets. We do not find that either driver’s license suspensions are associated with volume of traffic stops or traffic court docket size. In contrast, we find that Blacks and Latinx are overrepresented relative to the population. Linear mixed-level modeling regression analyses demonstrate that the population of whites below poverty, and blacks above poverty, are most strongly associated with more suspensions. Finally, we explore implications of these results for efforts to reconsider the imposition of driver’s license suspensions for non-driving-related reasons. These patterns raise constitutional concerns and practical challenges for policy efforts to undo such large-scale suspension of driving privileges.

William E. Crozier

Brandon L. Garrett

Driven to Failure: An Empirical Analysis of Driver’s License Suspension in North Carolina

驱向失败：北卡罗来纳州驾照吊销的实证分析

The sociological literature on domestic abuse shows that it is more complex than a series of physical assaults. Abusers use “coercive control” to subjugate their partners through a web of threats, humiliation, isolation, and demands. The presence of coercive control is highly predictive of future physical violence and is, in and of itself, also a violation of the victim’s liberty and dignity. In response to these new understandings the United Kingdom has recently criminalized non-violent coercive control, making it illegal to, on two or more occasions, cause “serious alarm or distress” to an intimate partner that has a “substantial effect” on her “day-to-day activities.” Such a vaguely-drafted crime would raise insurmountable due process problems under the U.S. Constitution. Should the states wish to address the gravity of the harms of coercive control, however, this Article proposes an alternative statutory approach. It argues that a state legislature could combine the due process limits to traditionally enterprise-related offenses such as fraud and conspiracy with the goals of domestic abuse prevention to create a new offense based upon the fraud-like nature of coercively controlling behavior. It argues that the most useful legal framework for defining coercive control is similar to that of common law fraud, and that legislatures should adapt the scienter requirements of fraud to the actus reus of coercive control. In so doing, this Article also argues that it is risky for legislatures to punish gender-correlated offenses with specialized legal solutions, rather than recognizing the interrelationship between such offenses and other well-established crimes.

Erin L. Sheley

Criminalizing Coercive Control Within the Limits of Due Process

在正当程序的限制下将胁迫控制犯罪化

Johnathan Hal

The Gorsuch Test: Gundy v. United States, Limiting the Administrative State, and the Future of Nondelegation

高尔苏克测试：冈迪诉美国案，限制行政国家，以及非授权原则的未来

Emmanuel Abraham Perea Jimenez

The Fourth Amendment Limits of Facial Recognition at the Border

第四修正案对边境人脸识别的限制

Katie Lew

Unbalanced: The Case for Removing Title IX’s Private College Admissions Exemption

不平衡：取消《教育法修正案第九条》对私立学院招生豁免的案例

Law enforcement agencies are increasingly turning to genetic databases as a way of solving crime, either through requesting the DNA of an identified suspect from a database or, more commonly, by matching crime-scene DNA with DNA profiles in a database in an attempt to identify a suspect or a family member of a suspect. Although both efforts would probably be called “searches” under common parlance, until recently they were clearly not searches for fourth amendment purposes, because the Supreme Court has defined that word in terms of “expectations of privacy society is prepared to recognize as reasonable” and has construed that phrase narrowly, without reference to society’s actual views. The empirical study presented in this article, which attempts to gauge those views, suggests that even the Court’s recent decision in Carpenter v. United States, which has expanded the definition of “search” to new terrains, is antithetical to societal norms as they apply in the genetic investigation context. In fact, our respondents considered law enforcement access to genetic information to be as intrusive as, or more intrusive than, searches of bedrooms, text messages or emails, not only when one’s DNA is held by healthcare providers, but also when it is obtained from direct-to-consumer genetic testing companies and public genealogy websites. Our research also suggests that the location of genetic information, rather than its nature or the purpose for which it is acquired, is the primary driver of these intrusiveness ratings. Based on this research, we argue that both police access to non-governmental genetic databases and police use of covert methods to collect DNA in the hope of matching crime scene DNA require judicial authorization, although not necessarily a traditional warrant. More broadly, we argue that empirical data about the public’s privacy concerns surrounding law enforcement’s collection of and access to genetic data should be an integral consideration in judicial determinations of how these activities should be regulated by the Constitution.

Christopher Slobogin

J. W. Hazel

A World of Difference? Law Enforcement, Genetic Data, and the Fourth Amendment

一个世界的差异？执法、基因数据与第四修正案

Lauren N. Smith

The Constitution and the Campaign Trail: When Political Action Becomes State Action

宪法与竞选之路：当政治行为成为国家行为

Scotty Schenck

Why Bartlett Is Not the End of Aggregated Minority Group Claims Under the Voting Rights Act

为什么巴特利特不是《投票权法》下少数群体集体诉求的终结

Abbreviation	Duke Law J.
Journal Impact	1.62
Quartiles(Global)	LAW(Q1)

ISSN	0012-7086, 1939-9111
h-index	51

Publication Information	Publisher: Duke Law Publications，Publishing cycle: ，Journal Type: journal，Open Access Journals: No
Basic data	Year of publication: 1996，Proportion of original research papers: 100.00%，Self Citation Rate:5.60%， Gold OA Rate: 0.00%

Duke Law Journal

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