The first issue of what was to become the Duke Law Journal was published in March 1951 as the Duke Bar Journal. Created to provide a medium for student expression, the Duke Bar Journal consisted entirely of student-written and student-edited work until 1953, when it began publishing faculty contributions. To reflect the inclusion of faculty scholarship, the Duke Bar Journal became the Duke Law Journal in 1957. In 1969, the Journal published its inaugural Administrative Law Symposium issue, a tradition that continues today.    Volume 1 of the Duke Bar Journal spanned two issues and 259 pages. In 1959, the Journal grew to four issues and 649 pages, growing again in 1970 to six issues and 1263 pages. Today, the Duke Law Journal publishes eight issues per volume. Our staff is committed to the purpose set forth in our constitution: to publish legal writing of superior quality. We seek to publish a collection of outstanding scholarship from established legal writers, up-and-coming authors, and our own student editors.

The first issue of the Duke Law Journal was published in March 1951 under the name Duke Bar Journal. It was created to provide a platform for student expression, consisting entirely of student-written and student-edited work until 1953, when faculty contributions were included. To reflect the inclusion of faculty scholarship, the Duke Bar Journal was renamed the Duke Law Journal in 1957. In 1969, the Journal published its inaugural Administrative Law Symposium issue, a tradition that continues today. Volume 1 of the Duke Bar Journal spanned two issues and 259 pages. By 1959, the Journal had grown to four issues and 649 pages, and in 1970 it expanded again to six issues and 1263 pages. Today, the Duke Law Journal publishes eight issues per volume. Our staff is committed to the purpose set forth in our constitution: to publish legal writing of superior quality. We aim to present a collection of outstanding scholarship from established legal writers, emerging authors, and our own student editors.

《Duke Law Journal》的第一期于1951年3月出版，最初名为《Duke Bar Journal》。该期刊旨在为学生提供表达的平台，最初完全由学生撰写和编辑，直到1953年开始接受教师的投稿。为了反映教师学术贡献的纳入，《Duke Bar Journal》于1957年更名为《Duke Law Journal》。1969年，期刊首次出版行政法研讨会特刊，这一传统至今仍在延续。第一卷的《Duke Bar Journal》包含两个期刊，共259页。1959年，期刊增至四期，649页；1970年再次增长至六期，1263页。如今，《Duke Law Journal》每卷出版八期。我们的团队致力于实现宪法中设定的目标：出版高质量的法律写作。我们希望汇集来自成熟法律作家、崭露头角的作者以及我们自己的学生编辑的杰出学术作品。

Duke Law Journal

Unlike rulemaking and judicial review, administrative adjudication is governed by a norm of exceptionalism. Agencies rarely adjudicate according to the Administrative Procedure Act’s formal adjudication provisions, and the statute has little role in defining informal adjudication or specifying its minimum procedural requirements. Due process has almost nothing to say about the matter.

The result is that there are few uniform, cross-cutting procedural requirements in adjudication, and most hearings are conducted using procedures tailored for individual agencies or programs. This Article explores the benefits and costs of adjudication’s exceptionalism norm, an analysis that implicates the familiar tension between uniformity and specialization in the law. It argues that the exceptionalism norm overemphasizes specialization, at great cost.

This Article urges a new regime designed to more properly balance the values of specialization and uniformity. The proposal contemplates that as in rulemaking, the project would entail an interbranch effort to protect fundamental rights and promote institutional integrity while preserving space for needed agency discretion.

Emily S. Bremer

Reckoning with Adjudication’s Exceptionalism Norm

审慎对待司法例外主义规范

This Article describes the rift between a due-process-focused jurisprudence on legal–financial obligations—the centerpiece of the current fight against criminalization of poverty—and the substantive and structural problems of poverty criminalization. It argues that judges can help address this disconnect while still operating within the scope of their authority by engaging in a demosprudence of poverty— “a democracy-enhancing jurisprudence” that actively seeks to learn from poor people themselves and movements for economic justice. This Article builds from demosprudential theory to offer guidance for judges in their reason-giving, rulemaking, and courtroom management practices.

Monica Bell

Stephanie Garlock

Alexander Nabavi-Noori

Toward a Demosprudence of Poverty

迈向贫困的民权法理

The interest of a person in a driver’s license is “substantial,” and the suspension of a license by the State can result in “inconvenience and economic hardship suffered,” as the U.S. Supreme Court has observed, including because a license may “essential in the pursuit of a livelihood.” However, forty-four U.S. states currently require indefinite suspension of driver’s licenses for non-driving-related reasons, such as failure to appear in court or pay fines for traffic infractions. There are no systematic, peer-reviewed analyses of individual-level and county-level data regarding such suspensions. This study describes the North Carolina population of suspended drivers and assesses how driver’s license suspension statutes operate relative to geography, race, and poverty. We analyze four decades of active suspension data in North Carolina, and find over 1,225,000 active suspensions for failures to appear for or pay traffic fines (amounting to one in seven adult drivers in the state). Second, we compare these data to: county population data; county-level police traffic stop data, collected as required by statute in North Carolina; and county-level data on volume and composition of traffic court dockets. We do not find that either driver’s license suspensions are associated with volume of traffic stops or traffic court docket size. In contrast, we find that Blacks and Latinx are overrepresented relative to the population. Linear mixed-level modeling regression analyses demonstrate that the population of whites below poverty, and blacks above poverty, are most strongly associated with more suspensions. Finally, we explore implications of these results for efforts to reconsider the imposition of driver’s license suspensions for non-driving-related reasons. These patterns raise constitutional concerns and practical challenges for policy efforts to undo such large-scale suspension of driving privileges.

William E. Crozier

Brandon L. Garrett

Driven to Failure: An Empirical Analysis of Driver’s License Suspension in North Carolina

走向失败：北卡罗来纳州驾照吊销的实证分析

Johnathan Hal

The Gorsuch Test: Gundy v. United States, Limiting the Administrative State, and the Future of Nondelegation

高尔舒克测试：冈迪诉美国案、限制行政国家与非授权原则的未来

Christine M. Mullen

Preclusion of Exclusion: How Many Bites Does DHS Get at the Deportation Apple?

排除的排除：国土安全部在遣返问题上能有多少次机会？

Emmanuel Abraham Perea Jimenez

The Fourth Amendment Limits of Facial Recognition at the Border

第四修正案对边境人脸识别的限制

Lauren N. Smith

The Constitution and the Campaign Trail: When Political Action Becomes State Action

宪法与竞选之路：当政治行动成为国家行为

Katie Lew

Unbalanced: The Case for Removing Title IX’s Private College Admissions Exemption

不平衡：取消《教育法修正案第九条》对私立学院招生豁免的案例

Law enforcement agencies are increasingly turning to genetic databases as a way of solving crime, either through requesting the DNA of an identified suspect from a database or, more commonly, by matching crime-scene DNA with DNA profiles in a database in an attempt to identify a suspect or a family member of a suspect. Although both efforts would probably be called “searches” under common parlance, until recently they were clearly not searches for fourth amendment purposes, because the Supreme Court has defined that word in terms of “expectations of privacy society is prepared to recognize as reasonable” and has construed that phrase narrowly, without reference to society’s actual views. The empirical study presented in this article, which attempts to gauge those views, suggests that even the Court’s recent decision in Carpenter v. United States, which has expanded the definition of “search” to new terrains, is antithetical to societal norms as they apply in the genetic investigation context. In fact, our respondents considered law enforcement access to genetic information to be as intrusive as, or more intrusive than, searches of bedrooms, text messages or emails, not only when one’s DNA is held by healthcare providers, but also when it is obtained from direct-to-consumer genetic testing companies and public genealogy websites. Our research also suggests that the location of genetic information, rather than its nature or the purpose for which it is acquired, is the primary driver of these intrusiveness ratings. Based on this research, we argue that both police access to non-governmental genetic databases and police use of covert methods to collect DNA in the hope of matching crime scene DNA require judicial authorization, although not necessarily a traditional warrant. More broadly, we argue that empirical data about the public’s privacy concerns surrounding law enforcement’s collection of and access to genetic data should be an integral consideration in judicial determinations of how these activities should be regulated by the Constitution.

Christopher Slobogin

J. W. Hazel

A World of Difference? Law Enforcement, Genetic Data, and the Fourth Amendment

差异的世界？执法、基因数据与第四修正案

As presidents make ever more expansive claims of executive power, Congress’s ability and willingness to counter the executive is often limited. That makes all the more significant instances when Congress does overcome structural and political challenges to pass legislation to rein in the president. But thanks to the Supreme Court’s invalidation of legislative vetoes in INS v. Chadha, such congressional actions are necessarily subject to presidential veto. President Donald Trump, for example, vetoed joint resolutions aimed at restraining executive action relating to the border wall and war powers. Although vetoed bills are not binding law, this Article argues that neither are they legal nullities; instead, judges, executive branch lawyers, and other interpreters can use majoritarian congressional opposition to the executive as an interpretive tool. The result is a novel “Youngstown canon of construction”: when Congress passes a bill or resolution by a majority of both houses and the president exercises the veto, preventing the act from becoming law, then the expressed congressional opposition to the president’s view should be used to narrowly construe the underlying statutory or constitutional authority the president is claiming, if that authority is ambiguous. The proposed canon would help to counteract overbroad claims of executive power in important areas such as war powers, the National Emergencies Act, treaty termination, and the scope of federal preemption of state laws.

Kristen E. Eichensehr

The Youngstown Canon: Vetoed Bills and the Separation of Powers

《扬斯敦法典：被否决的法案与权力分立》

Abbreviation	Duke Law J.
Journal Impact	1.62
Quartiles(Global)	LAW(Q1)

ISSN	0012-7086, 1939-9111
h-index	51

Publication Information	Publisher: Duke Law Publications，Publishing cycle: ，Journal Type: journal，Open Access Journals: No
Basic data	Year of publication: 1996，Proportion of original research papers: 100.00%，Self Citation Rate:5.60%， Gold OA Rate: 0.00%

Duke Law Journal

Journal Citation Format

A journal article with 1 author

A journal article with 2 authors

A journal article with 3 authors

A journal article with 5 or more authors

Books Citation Format

Thesis Citation Format

Web sites Citation Format

Patent Citation Format

Staying up late manually editing references? ivySCI automatically matches journals and helps you generate references with a single click.

Share Submission Experience